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NOTES 
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-Inadequacy of 
Consideration As a Factor in Determining 
Unconscionahility Under Section 2-302 
of the Uniform Commercial Code 
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) provides 
that a court may refuse to enforce all or part of a contract if it finds 
that the contract, or any part of it, was unconscionable when made.1 
In American Home Improvement, Inc. v. l\1.aciver2 the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire apparently held that a price substantially 
in excess of the value of the goods and services sold was sufficient in 
itself to constitute unconscionability under this provision of the 
Code. The high price was at least in part attributable to high time-
credit charges, and, as noted by the court, the contract could have 
been invalidated on the ground that the seller had violated a state 
law by not disclosing these charges in full.3 Nevertheless, the lan-
guage of the opinion leads to the conclusion that the inadequacy of 
consideration alone constituted unconscionability.4 
In several other cases5 striking down contract provisions, it is 
unclear whether courts viewed inadequacy of consideration as suffi-
cient to make the contract unconscionable within the meaning of 
section 2-302. Others factors may have been essential to these courts' 
I. This section provides: 
(I) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract 
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to 
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid 
the court in making the determination. 
2. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964). 
3. Under the new Truth in Lending Bill (Consumer Credit Protection Act), 15 
U.S.C. § 1601-77 (Supp. IV, 1968), disclosure of credit terms is required in all states, 
Id. § 1631. 
4. The court stated that there was "[an] independent reason why the recovery 
should be barred in the present case because the transaction was unconscionable" and 
then proceeded to document the disproportionate price. 105 N.H. at 439, 201 A.2d at 
888. 
5. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see FrostiFresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 
52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966) (contract calling for excessive 
credit charges was held to be unconscionable, the court noting that negotiations were 
conducted in Spanish, while the contract itself, which was not explained to the defen-
dant, was in English); Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 15 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1967) (defendant, after exacting several fees from the plaintiff, refused to 
return plaintiff's repossessed car; contract held unconscionable and defendant ordered 
to return the car); In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., Inc., 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1016 (E.D. 
Pa. 1965); In re Dorset Steel Equip. Co., 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1965) 
(referee in bankruptcy refused enforcement of two security agreements under section 
2-302 because they were too one-sided in favor of creditors). 
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decisions. In In re State v. ITM, Inc.6 the defendants sold electrical 
appliances door-to-door, charging extremely high prices and making 
misrepresentations which were fraudulent under a state statute.7 
The New York trial court stated that the disparity of consideration 
was equivalent to that in Aiaclver and was sufficient "to clearly 
render such transactions unconscionable."8 However, in the same 
sentence, the court stated that "when the deceptive practices are 
also considered, there can be no doubt about the unreasonableness 
and unfairness of these agreements."9 In another New York case, 
Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez,10 plaintiff seller brought suit to 
enforce a contract for the sale of a 1959 Buick. The buyer's defense 
was that after the sale he had discovered several mechanical defects 
and that therefore the contract price was much more than the car 
was worth. In denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, 
the court noted that "[ e ]xcessively high prices may constitute uncon-
scionable contractual provisions within the meaning of Section 2~302 
UCC."11 But the court added that defendants should have an op-
portunity to present evidence as to the over-all purpose and effect 
of the contract to aid the court in determining whether it is un-
conscionable.12 This latter statement arguably implies that uncon-
scionability should not be found solely on the basis of excessive 
price. 
In a recent case, Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,13 a New York 
trial court relied on section 2-302 to hold that welfare recipients 
who had paid almost 620 dollars on the installment purchase of a 
6. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
7. The defendants violated subsection 12 of section 63 of the Executive Law of 
New York which provides: 
'Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or 
otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting 
or transaction of business, the attorney-general may apply ... for an order enjoin-
ing the continuance of such business activity ... and the court may award the 
relief applied for .... The word "fraud" or "fraudulent" as used herein shall 
include any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud and any deception, misrepresen-
tation, concealment, suppression, false pretence, false promise or unconscionable 
contractual provisions. 
N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1968-1969). The court found the defendants' 
statements to be both false and unconscionable within the meaning of this statute. 
Defendants also violated section 402(2) of N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw (McKinney Supp. 1968-
1969) which provides that "[a] contract or obligation shall contain the entire agree-
ment of the parties with respect to the goods and services," that promises to the 
buyer to compensate him for referrals must be in the contract, and that the contract 
must contain a clause permitting compensation earned to be deducted from the out-
standing balance otherwise due under the contract. 
8. 52 Misc. 2d at 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321. 
9. 52 Misc. 2d at 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321. 
IO. 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 69 (N.Y. City Civil Ct. Rec. 1967). 
II. 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 70. 
12. 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 70. 
13. 37 U.S.L.W. 2549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., March 21, 1969). 
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freezer with a maximum retail value of 300 dollars14 were entitled 
to keep the appliance in spite of the seller's claim that the purchasers 
still owed nearly 820 dollars in payments. The judge stated that 
"[t]here is no reason to doubt ... that [section 2-302] is intended 
to encompasss the price term of the agreement."15 But in phrasing 
the issue for decision, the court asked "whether or not, under the 
circumstances of this case, the sale ... is unconscionable as a matter 
of law."16 The court held that it was, but not without discussion of 
the "circumstances."17 It stressed the huge disproportion between 
price and retail value, and stated that this mathematical disparity 
"carries the greatest weight."18 Thus, the court did not clear up the 
uncertainty about whether excessive price alone can constitute un-
conscionability. 
Under the general common law of contracts, inadequacy of con-
sideration by itself was simply no basis for legal relief.19 Even in 
equity, relief for excessive price was difficult to obtain. In a few 
cases courts cancelled contracts solely because of inadequacy of con-
sideration, but in these cases the inadequacy was so great as to "shock 
the conscience."20 Equity courts were more willing to grant relief, 
both affirmative and defensive, when an excessive price was accom-
panied by other inequitable incidents.21 In both situations, how-
ever, the courts based their decisions on the traditional theories 
of fraud, mistake, and undue influence, and not on inadequacy of 
consideration. 
An affirmative fair exchange doctrine, known as laesio enormis, 
existed in medieval law and has been incorporated into many civil 
law codes.22 These codes authorize recision of contracts of sale 
when it can be shown that there was disproportionate consider-
ation. A precise mathematical standard is sometimes used to evalu-
ate prices, the courts considering a price "disproportionate" if it is 
a certain percentage greater than the market value of the item for 
which it is exchanged.23 Cases under the Louisiana Civil Code, 
14. The plaintiffs' (purchasers) proof at trial of the maximum retail value of the 
freezer was not controverted by the defendant seller. 37 U.S.L.W. at 2549. 
15. 37 U.S.L.W. at 2549, citing FrostiFresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966); In re State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 
303 (Sup. Ct. 1966); and American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maciver, 105 N.H. 435, 
201 A.2d 886 (1964). 
16. 37 U.S.L.W. at 2549. 
17. See notes 44-45 infra and accompanying text. 
18. 37 U.S.L.W. at 2550. 
19. 1 A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §§ 127, 128 (1963 ed). 
20. 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 927, at 634 n.13 (S. Symons, 5th ed. 1941). 
21. Id. at § 928. 
22. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 127, 128 (1963 ed.); 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRU· 
DENCE § 927, at 637 n.18 (S. Symons, 5th ed. 1941). See Dawson, Economic Duress and 
the Fair Exchange in French and German Law, (pts. 1 &: 2), 11 TuL. L. REV. 345, 364 
(1937), (pt. 3) 12 TuL. L. REv. 42 (1937). 
23. See Dawson, supra note 22, at 364-76. 
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which adopts the civil law principle of lesion by providing that a 
reasonably proportionate price is required to sustain a contract of 
sale,24 illustrate that in practice civil-law courts are reluctant to 
assess price differentials. The Louisiana courts have refused to inter-
fere with merely highly profitable bargains and have demanded 
gross disproportion between price and market value before they 
will set contracts aside. In effect, they thereby limit the doctrine of 
laesio so that it operates to invalidate only those contracts which 
are supported by no more than nominal consideration.25 Under 
such a test even the contracts involved in Maclver and the other 
three cases discussed above could have been upheld. However, it is 
important to recognize that the laesio doctrine, whether applied 
conservatively or liberally, does focus solely on price. 
It is doubtful that the Uniform Commercial Code was intended 
to authorize a shift to the laesio approach. Prior to the adoption of 
section 2-302 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, there 
was concern that inclusion of such a provision in the Code would 
interfere with the freedom of a buyer and seller to contract and 
that judicial investigation of the adequacy of consideration was in-
consistent with our competitive economy.26 Perhaps in reaction to 
this fear, the official comment to section 2-302 indicates that, at least 
in the drafters' opinion, the main function of section 2-302 was 
merely to reaffirm the propriety of judicial scrutiny in areas pre-
24. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art 2464 (West 1952), which requires that the price not be 
"out of all proportion of the thing." For an interpretation of this section, see Herbert 
Be Lazarus, Some Problems Regarding Price in the Louisiana Law of Sales, 4 LA. L. REv. 
378, 412-18 (1942). A number of states have adopted statutes which permit courts to 
use inadequacy of consideration as a basis for the denial of specific performance. See, 
e.g., CALIF. CIV. CODE § 3391 (West 1954). In such states, while a legal right to relief 
theoretically exists, at least one study indicates that when equitable relief was denied, 
no legal relief was in fact forthcoming. See Frank &: Endicott, Defenses in Equity and 
"Legal Rights," 14 LA. L. REv. 380 (1954). 
25. See Brooks v. Broussard, 136 La. 380, 67 S. 65 (1914) (price which equalled at 
least one-half the value of the property sufficient to support the contract). See also 
Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co,, 143 F. Supp. 826 (D.C. La. 1956). In 
cases decided under the California statute relating to the denial of specific performance, 
courts were more willing to assess the inadequacy. For cases holding that consideration 
was inadequate, see Cornblith v. Valentine, 211 Cal. 243, 294 P. 1065 (1930) (price was 
two-thirds of the value); Wilson v. White, 161 Cal. 453, 119 P. 895 (1911) (discrepancy 
of 1,000 dollars in 14,000 dollars transaction sufficient where other elements of over-
reaching appeared); Dessert Seed Co, v. Garbus, 66 Cal. App. 2d 838, 153 P.2d 184 
(1944) (price 3,400 dollars, reasonable market value 5,000 dollars); cf. Miami Tribe v. 
United States, 281 F.2d 202 (Ct. CI. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961) (payment 
of less than one-half market value is unconscionable), 
26. See, e.g., Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk 
Sales Articles of the U.C.C., 48 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 42 (1962); King, Suggested Changes in 
the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 33 ORE. L. REv. 113, 116 (1954); Legislation, 
Definition and Interpretation of Unconscionable Contracts, 58 DICK. L. REv. 161 (1954); 
Note, Policing Contracts Under the Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 
146, 151 (1950); Note, Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Conse-
quences of Unconscionability in Sales Contracts, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954). 
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viously subject to the courts' supervision-for example, limitations 
on remedies and disclaimers of warranty.27 The comment asserts 
that section 2-302 was designed to prevent "oppression and unfair 
surprise"; it was not intended to change the "allocation of risks be-
cause of superior bargaining power,"28 nor was it designed to pro-
tect the foolish from bad bargains. It appears, therefore, that cases 
like Maciver and Jones, which apparently equate excessive price 
with unconscionability, are beyond the intended purview of sec-
tion 2-302. 
Whatever the drafters of the Code may have intended, the cases 
demonstrate that courts examining contractual arrangements may 
consider adequacy of consideration an important factor; some courts 
may go so far as to hold that proof of inadequacy of consider-
ation is enough in itself to establish unconscionability. This recent 
development raises two major questions: How should a court assess 
the price charged by the seller to determine whether it is in fact 
too high for the goods or services offered to the buyer?29 And, if a 
court requires other elements than disproportionate price for a 
showing of unconscionability, what should these other elements be? 
A two-step approach can be used to develop a standard for de-
termining whether a seller's price is out of line. The first step is to 
decide whether a seller's markup-the difference between the selling 
price and the wholesale price of the goods, or his profit-the differ-
ence between the selling price and the cost of the goods sold (includ-
ing selling and operating expenses), provides the best measure of the 
fairness of his price. If markup is used, a seller could legitimately 
complain that he was denied the same rate of return as other sellers 
27. See, e.g., Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 
414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937); Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 
144 S.E. 327 (1928). See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 
A.2d 69 (1960); Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the U.C.C., 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 
401, 408-15 (1961). 
The decision to define unconscionability by reference to those areas in which courts 
had previously deemed contracts unconscionable-for instance, warranty disclaimers 
and liquidated damage clauses---is anomalous because the Code deals in detail :with 
what is permissible in these types of clauses. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316, 
2-719 [hereinafter UCC]. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 485, 516-24 (1967) which suggests that in view of the way 
the Code regulates such clauses in detail, it is difficult to assume that section 2-302 
adds anything in the way of protection from unconscionability. Leff suggests that the 
reason for the paradox may simply be imprecise drafting. 
The only case referred to in the official comment which would support the proposi-
tion that inadequacy of consideration should suffice for unconscionability is Campbell 
Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). If the drafters intended to incorporate 
this notion into the Code, it is likely they would have made a more substantial refer• 
ence to it than a "cf.'' See Leff, supra, at 530, 538. 
28. See UCC § 2-302, comment I. 
29. The result in Maclver emphasizes the need to develop standards for assessing 
the fairness of the price. The carrying charge in that case, which the court failed to 
calculate, was apparently only eighteen per cent. See Leff, supra note 27, at 549-51, 
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because he had sales expenses, overhead, bad debts, or other costs 
which were not reflected in this measure of consideration.3° Consum-
ers may also be adversely affected by the use of a markup standard. 
Many sellers provide transportation, installation, or other services 
free of charge when goods are purchased. Such a seller's price may 
be relatively high, but it may be the best price obtainable for the 
combination of goods and services which he provides. If this price 
is deemed unconscionable, as it might well be under a strict markup 
standard, the seller will probably eliminate or at least reduce his 
free services, and this would be to the detriment of consumers. A 
profit standard, by taking all costs into account, presents a fairer 
picture of the transaction and thus seems to be a better unit of 
measurement. The only difficulty with using profit is that different 
accounting methods will often produce different results, even when 
individual sales are involved. This difficulty is not insurmountable; 
in other circumstances, courts have weighed the merits of different 
accounting systems to determine which best reflects a seller's costs.31 
A similar approach should be used in cases involving claims of un-
conscionability because of excessive price. 
The second important step in analyzing a challenged transaction 
is to develop a standard of fair profit with which the particular 
seller's profit can be compared. The simplest standard would be a 
fixed percentage of profit applicable to all sellers, but this seems to 
be inconsistent with the ideal of a free market economy regulated 
by the mechanism of competition.32 According to this ideal, the 
emergence of abnormally high profits in a particular market will 
30. The usury laws typically set a flat rate which may be charged for the use of 
money. This approach resembles the use of a markup standard in that costs are not 
taken into account in computing the rate of interest. The inflexible rate set by the 
usury laws has been criticized as unreflective of the true costs and risks involved to 
the lender. See, e.g., F. RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS 9-10, 174 (1924). 
31. See INT. R.Ev. CooE OF 1954, § 446, which requires that taxable income be 
computed according to an accounting method which clearly reflects a taxpayer's in-
come. "[W]e read 'clearly reflect the income .. .' to mean •.. that income should be 
reflected with as much accuracy as standard methods of accounting practice permit 
[rather than merely fairly and honestly].'' Caldwell v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 112, 
114-15 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Niles Bement-Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357 
(1930) (an accrual method was required); Kahuku Plantation Co. v. Commissioner, 
132 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1942) (allowed a hybrid method to be used); Boynton v. Pedrick, 
136 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), afj'd., 228 F.2d 745 (2dpr. 1954); Motors Securities 
Co., Inc., ,r 52,316 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1952) (tax court held discounts on notes not 
to be income to an auto finance company in the year of purchase; instead, the court 
ruled that it was permissible to spread the income over the life of the notes when 
that practice had been followed for years and income was not distorted); Bellevue 
Mfg. Co., 1J 57,094 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1957) (tax court required a cash accounting 
method). 
32. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 3-11 (1967); J. BAIN, PRICING DISTRIBUTION 
AND EMPLOYMENT 5, 65-66, 130 (rev. ed. 1953). See also P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 39-57, 
778-93 (1967). 
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attract new entrants into that market.33 These will be new en-
terprises or will come from relatively unproductive segments of 
the economy, and their entry into the market to take advantage of 
the demand creating the high pro.fits will achieve a desirable allo-
cation of resources.34 Their arrival is also supposed to drive profits 
down to a level consistent with the costs and risks of operating in 
the particular market.35 Theoretically, judicial precedent prohibit-
ing profits above a certain percentage of the cost of a good would 
place an artificial limitation on sellers in the market, with the result 
that new entrants would not be attracted, economic resources would 
not be correctly allocated, and price competition would not be stim-
ulated. It may be argued that these theories of a free market econ-
omy do not conform to the realities of the economic system.86 How-
ever, these theories are embodied in the antitrust laws37 and in other 
state and federal statutes,38 and inconsistent rules should not be 
promulgated by the courts.39 
A better test would be to compare a seller's profit to the profits of 
similarly situated sellers. This would remove the problem of dis-
couraging market entry, because sellers in the market would not be 
forced to maintain an artificially low price. However, if a court does 
not make certain that the sellers used for comparison to the chal-
lenged seller are indeed similarly situated, its decision may yet be in 
conflict with the ideal of a free market economy. Some sellers who 
are more successful than their competitors should be allowed to reap 
greater profits; they provide additional benefits for consumers and 
spur their competitors to emulate them. If other sellers in the market 
do improve their operations in some manner, there will be increased 
consumer benefits and, because of the resulting increase in comped-
33. See P. ARE.EDA, supra note 32, at 3. 
34. Id. at 11. 
35. Id. at 4. 
36. See T. ARNOLD, FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937). See also P. ARE.EDA, supra note 
32, at 11. 
37. See P. ARE.EDA, supra note 32, at 3-4; see also A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAws OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29-30 (1966). 
38. See P. AREEDA, supra note 32, at 3. 
39. Suggesting that the theories underlying the unconscionability clause of section 
2-302 are the same as those underlying antitrust laws and other statutes does not imply 
that the unconscionability clause is to be administered as extensively as some of those 
laws are. Obviously, courts are not to police contracts for unconscionable provisions in 
the same way that the Federal Trade Commission polices contracts, mergers, and other 
agreements which restrain trade; courts are to determine unconscionability only when 
a private litigant has raised the issue, Because most buyers do not know of the uncon-
scionability clause and because most losses which occur as a result of unconscionable 
contract provisions are not costly enough to warrant a court action, the unconscionabil-
ity clause will not deter unreasonable commercial practices to any great degree. More 
regulation may be needed in this field; if so, legislatures will have to provide more 
effective enforcement machinery than section 2-302. For an example of such legislation, 
see the discussion in note 7 supra, of the New York statute which authorizes the state 
attorney general to bring suit when a seller misleads a buyer. 
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tion, these benefits may well be available at a lower price. Thus, 
sellers should not be penalized for higher profits if these profits 
are attributable to excellent business locations, to particularly effi-
cient operations, or to access to a particular class of customers who 
are willing and able to pay more for their products;40 competitors 
should be encouraged to improve their locations and operations and 
to seek out high-paying customers. Greater profits would also be 
justified if the seller offers a high-quality or an unusual product 
or if he provides a better quantitative or qualitative selection of 
ancillary services than his competitors. 
All of these considerations make it clear that great care must be 
exercised in deciding which sellers in a given market are "similarly 
situated." A certain fixed percentage of the average profit of sim-
ilarly situated sellers could be chosen as the dividing line for deter-
mining whether a challenged seller's profit is excessive, but this 
probably would not be desirable. Because of the possibilities of error 
inherent in determining a seller's profit and in finding comparable 
sellers, there can be no certainty to the test suggested above. More-
over, applying a fixed standard based on percentage of profit above 
cost of goods sold would create only the illusion of certainty. Worse, 
such a test would be inflexible. Courts should not evaluate the seller's 
price in a vacuum, as they would in effect be doing if they applied a 
a fixed standard. The judge should ascertain the extent to which the 
seller's profit exceeds that of his competitors-that much is clear. 
However, he should weigh this factor in the context of the particular 
case, requiring less in the way of excess profits for a finding of un-
conscionability when certain other factors are present. Factors which 
a court should consider are those which demonstrate, with more force 
than the mere presence of high prices and profit margins, that the 
seller intended to take unfair advantage of the buyer. Because of the 
imprecision involved in comparing prices and profits, courts should 
be reluctant to declare contracts unconscionable when such circum-
stances are not present in the case. 
The buyer's inability to comprehend the transaction is one factor 
which could lead to a finding of unconscionability. In FrostiFresh 
Corp. v. Reynoso,41 a contract calling for excessive credit charges was 
40. A seller can cultivate high-paying customers as long as he does not restrict other 
sellers from dealing with those customers: 
As we see it, the laws of the United States do not require that persons engaged in 
private trade and commerce must deal with everyone. When they do deal they 
may not discriminate, but they do have the right to choose their customers. 
The Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act itself provides in sec-
tion 2(a) "Nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged m selling goods, 
wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona 
fide transactions and not in constraint of trade." Sec. 13(a), Title 15 U.S.C.A. 
Chicago Seating Co. v. S. Karper & Bros., 177 F.2d 863, 867 (7th Cir. 1949). See also 
FTC v. Bausch & Lomb, 321 U.S. 707 (1944). 
41. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966). 
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held unconscionable. The New York court noted that negotiations 
for the contract were conducted in Spanish, but the contract itself, 
which was not fully explained to the defendant, was in English.42 
This factual context presents a substantial possibility that the buyer 
misunderstood the implications of the contract and that he was in 
fact exploited by the seller. The court was clearly correct in taking 
it into account. The question arises, however, whether courts should 
consider less obvious indicia of a buyer's low degree of commercial 
sophistication, such as his low intelligence level or his lack of knowl-
edge of the seller's business. Courts are justifiably much more likely 
to consider these relatively subjective indicia of the buyer's knowl-
edge if it is clear that the seller was aware of the buyer's short-
comings and played upon them. In Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co.,43 for example, the court held two installment con-
tracts unconscionable on the grounds that the seller knew of the 
buyers' lack of education and poor financial position and yet in-
serted in each of the contracts an "obscure" provision which allowed 
the seller in the event of a default, to repossess all items the buyers 
had previously purchased from him.44 In Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 
discussed above, the New York Supreme Court stated that 
a caveat is warranted lest we reduce the import of Section 2-302 solely 
to a mathematical ratio formula. It may, at times, be that; yet it may 
also be much more. The very limited financial resources of the 
purchaser, known to sellers at the time of the sale, is entitled to 
weight in the balance. Indeed, the value disparity itself leads inevi-
tably to the felt conclusion that knowing advantage was taken of 
plaintiffs.40 
Some sales techniques might be sufficient in themselves, or at 
least when coupled with excess price, to render a contract uncon-
scionable. A seller's failure to disclose an important aspect of the 
42. It is not clear that these facts were necessary to the court's decision. 
43. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
44. See Note, Contracts-Enforcement-Unconscionable Installment Sales Contract 
Is Unenforceable, 79 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1299 (1965). The court could not base its decision 
on section 2-302 because the Code was not in effect in the District of Columbia when 
the contracts in question were made. It held that the rule of section 2-302 was part 
of the common law of the district, and, alternatively, that it could adopt this rule 
pursuant to its power to develop the common law of the district. 350 F.2d at 447-48 
(D.C. Cir. 1965). The contract provision referred to in Williams is commonly called 
an "add on" clause. Only one state has a statute forbidding such clauses and Maryland 
specifically allows them. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 485, 554-55 (1967). 
In Jones, discussed at notes 13-18 supra and accompanying text, the court cited 
Walker for the proposition that "the meaningfulness of choice essential to the making 
of a contract, can be negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power." 37 U.S.L.W. 
at 2550. 
45. 37 U.S.L.W. 2550 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 21, 1969). 
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transaction to the buyer is one factor which might support a finding 
of unconscionability. Thus, in Maciver the court was probably influ-
enced by the fact that the seller had failed to disclose finance 
charges.46 High pressure sales tactics would also be relevant in de-
termining whether a contract is unconscionable. In In re State 
v. ITJ1, Inc. the court held that the seller's "deceptive prac-
tices," in conjunction with disproportionate price, established 
grounds for a holding of unconscionability.47 Maclver and In re 
State v. ITJ1, Inc. were relatively easy cases because the sales prac-
tices engaged in were defined as illegal under state statutes. 48 In 
addition to such state legislation, the courts might examine standards 
of fair dealer activity developed by government agencies devoted to 
consumer protection49 and by trade associations. When such criteria 
for evaluating particular selling tactics are not relevant or available, 
the courts should probably consider the practices of other sellers. 
Before accepting dealer practices as evidence, however, courts should 
make sure that the practices are designed to provide fair treatment 
for buyers and are not used simply to promote efficiency.60 
There is, of course, a counterargument that courts should not 
consider the buyer's degree of commercial sophistication or the sel-
ler's business practices, at least when these practices do not violate 
state or federal statutes. It may be argued that such an approach 
eliminates the traditional adversary relationship between buyer and 
seller and institutes an agency relationship in which sellers have a 
vague duty to warn and to care for buyers. However, since requiring 
sellers to conform to statutes which define moral business practices 
does not seem to be harsh or unjustifiable,51 administrative guides, 
trade association rules, and accepted dealer practices should be re-
garded in the same way. Such requirements certainly do not give rise 
to agency relationships; nor do they impose new duties. Section 
2-302 and other provisions of the Code were apparently intended to 
eliminate the harsh consequences of a completely adversary relation-
ship between buyer and seller, and this purpose can be accomplished 
only by allowing courts to inquire into sellers' practices and buyers' 
46. See notes 2•4 supra and accompanying text. 
47. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
48. The statute involved in Maciver required disclosure of time-credit charges. The 
statute involved in In re State v. ITM, Inc. is quoted in note 7 supra. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission, for example, issues guidelines for use in examining the 
fairness of such dealer practices as price advertising, reduction of prices, and retail 
price comparisons. See FTC Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R. pt. 233 (1949). 
49. For a general discussion of trade associations and professional codes of ethics, 
see J. BRADLEY, THE ROLE OF TRADE AssocIATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL BUSINESS SOCIETIES 
IN AMERICA (1965); G. LAMB, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS LAW AND PRACTICE (1956). 
50. For example, it may be common practice to fill in all the blanks on a credit 
form simply because doing so tends to insure accuracy later. 
51. See In re State v. ITM, Inc., 52 ~lisc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
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capabilities.52 Statutes are helpful in determining which events and 
circumstances make a contract unconscionable, and more compre-
hensive legislation is certainly needed in this area. However, con-
sidering the infinite variety of contract provisions and selling prac-
tices, it is doubtful that legislatures could designate all the activities 
which a court should consider in assessing the cases which come be-
fore it. Furthermore, extremely detailed legislation might prevent 
courts from weighing different dealer practices in light of the effect 
they have on purchasers with different intelligence levels and back-
grounds. For these reasons courts should look beyond legislation to 
other prevalent definitions of acceptable business practices in deter-
mining unconscionability. 
It is more questionable whether courts should follow the prece-
dent set in Williams and consider the buyer's financial status and the 
seller's knowledge of it. A buyer's wealth is not necessarily indica-
tive of his ability to bargain with sellers, although, given facts 
similar to those in Jones, a court may suggest that this is the 
case. However, a buyer's financial position is relevant to some 
issues arising in these cases and probably should be considered for 
that reason. In usury cases it has been observed that poor borrowers 
often do not question the terms set by lenders because they fear they 
will be refused loans elsewhere.53 Some lenders probably take advan-
tage of this state of affairs by charging usurious rates and by imposing 
other difficult contract terms on borrowers. If the poor borrower is 
buying goods on an installment basis, the seller-lender has the oppor-
tunity to exploit the buyer's fear of being refused credit elsewhere. 
In an attempt to circumvent the usury laws, he may charge an ex-
cessive price for the goods instead of imposing high interest rates. 
Since the buyer's financial status and the seller's knowledge of it 
are the determinants of the buyer's vulnerability, courts should 
examine these factors for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether 
and to what extent coercion and deception exist.64 It has been argued 
52. It is nevertheless true that the drafters of section 2-302 may not have envisioned 
such inquiries. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
Some states have also increased their legislation regulating dealer activities. See, 
e.g., Maryland Retail InstaUment Sales Act, Mo. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 132A-52 (Supp. 
1968) [referred to in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965)]; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1968-1969); N.Y. PERS. PROP. 
LAw § 402(2) (McKinney Supp. 1968-1969) [referred to in In re State v. ITM, Inc.,. 52 
Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966)]. 
53. See In re WiUiam Sylvester Branch, 40 REF. J. 101, 102 (N.D. Tenn. 1966) (mem.). 
54. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,447 (D.C. Cir. 1965): 
Unconscionability has generaIIy been recognized to include an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which 
are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a meaningful choice is 
present in a particular case can only be determined by consideration of all the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of 
,the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. 
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that a court's consideration of these factors would confuse the issues 
and create uncertainty as to the basis for the decision;55 but this 
criticism holds true only when the court does not make its limited 
purpose clear, and thus it seems to be mainly a criticism of judicial 
writing. 
In summary, although the draftsmen of the Code did not intend 
such results, several recent cases seem to hold that excessive price is 
enough in itself to constitute unconscionability under section 2-302. 
Since these decisions stress price as the most important factor in the 
determination of whether or not a contract is unconscionable, stan-
dards should be developed for asserting price. It is submitted that a 
price should be held sufficiently excessive to render a contract uncon-
scionable if it gives the seller a greater profit than similarly situ-
ated sellers ordinarily receive. This test presents the most accurate 
assessment of the transaction in question and it also conforms to the 
economic theories incorporated in our antitrust laws and other stat-
utes. However, the courts should not apply an inflexible percentage 
standard to determine in the abstract whether a seller's profit is 
excessive; instead, they should evaluate the differential between the 
seller's profit and that of his competitors in the light of such factors 
as the buyer's ability to understand the transaction and in light of 
generally accepted commercial practices. Finally, because of the pos-
sibilities of error inherent in assessing price, it is suggested that 
courts ordinarily should not declare contracts unconscionable if 
there is no evidence of the seller's overreaching other than the 
excessive price. 
55. The attorney who argued the Walker-Thomas case for Mrs. Williams has stated 
that the infusion of the financial status of the consumer confuses the issues, "creating 
a degree of uncertainty" around the decision. See Skilton &: Helstad, Protection of the 
Installment Buyer of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REv. 
1465, 1480 (1967). 
